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age.state, have been largely changed by their intercourse with the
whites, if they still retain their tribal organization, which is recognised by the national government, as shown by having its Indian
agent among them, paying annuities and dealing otherwise with the
"head men :" The Iansas indians, 5 Wall. 737.
The Pacific Railroad claimed the benefit of the principle of Mc"Cullocl v. Maryland, upon the ground that the road was constricted under the direction and authority of Congress, for the
uses and purposes of the United States, and was a -part of a system of roads thus constructed, and that the aids granted by Congress to the road were in exercise of its powers to regulate commerce,
establish post-offices and post-roads, to raise and support armies
and to suppress insurrection and invasion. The claim was not
sustained, the court drawing the distinction between the means
employed by the government and the property of agents employed
by the government. The instrumentalities created by the government for its purposes are exempt, but a corporation deriving its
existence from state law, exercising its franchise under state law,
and holding its property within state jurisdiction, is liable to state
taxation for its property. The railroad is only an agent employed
by the government, which employment entitles it to no peculiar
privileges as to the taxation of its property: Thomson v. Pacific

Railroad, 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Id. 5.
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Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
MARIANNA RAY v. JOSIAH SIMMONS.
B. deposited in a savings bank certain money in his own name as trustee for R.
and gave the bank-book to R., who was his step-daughter ; R. returned the book to
B., in whose control it remained until his death.

In an equity suit by R. against

the administrator of B., claiming the deposit as trust funds held by B. for R.:
Beld, that the trust was completely constituted.
Held, further, that the trust being constituted, the fact that it wa

voluntary

was no reason for refusing relief.
To constitute a trust it is enough if the owner of property conveys it to another.
in trust, or if the owner of personalty unequivocally declares, either orally or in
writing, that he holds it in presnti in trust for another.
A bill in equity to enforce a trust brought against an administrator alleged
that the respondent as administrator withdrew a bank deposit, being thetrust funds
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in question,

The answer alleged the respondent's appointment as administrator

in Massachusetts, and that as such lie withdrew the deposit and held the same am
part of his decedent's estate. Hcld, in the absence of denial by the administrator,
that lc held the deposit as administrator in Rhode Island, that the court would
presume he held it as administrator in Rhode Island and would order him to account directly with the complainant, the trust having been proven.

IN EQUITY.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

C(harles XW Salisbury & L. Salisbury, for complainant.
Tillinghast J- -Ely, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The principal question in tbis'casc is whether
the plaintiff is beneficially entitled to a sum of money which was
formerly on deposit in the Fall River Savings Bank. The deposit
was made by the late Levi Bosworth, in his own name, as trustee
for the plaintiff,-the account contained in the bank-book which
was furnished to Bosworth being headed as follows, to wit: "Dr.
Fall River Savings Bank, in account'with Levi Bosworth, trustce
for Marianna Ray, Prov. Cr." The first deposit of $484 is credited
as cash, under the date of April 6th 1868. The account is also
credited with cash, October 31st 1868, $50, and January 8th 18S72,
$70, and with divers dividends. .All the dividends were credited
as they accrued, except one of $25.66, which was paid to Bosworth, October 12th 1870. And this was the only money withdrawn from the deposit by him previous to his death, which
occurred September 15th 1872. The plaintiff, Marianna Ray, is
the daughter of Ruth M. Bosworth, the widow of Levi Bosworth,
by a former husband. She lived in the family of Levi Bosworth
for several years previous to his death. Levi Bosworth had no
children. Mrs. Bosworth testifies that he treated the plaintiff as
his daughter. She also testifies that the first she knew of the
bank-book, Mr. Bosworth brought it home and threw it in the
plaintiff's lap. The plaintiff opened and read it, and said she was
much obliged for the present. Bosworth said nothing in reply.
She, 2irs. Bosworth, put the book in a box where she kept her
own bank-book, a bank-book of her daughter, and bank-books
belonging to her husband. She says he carried the book to Fall
River three times to have the interest entered, and gave it to the
plaintiff on his return. Ile was a nian of few words, and would
do things without explanation. Wheni he made the last deposit
DURFEE,
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of $70 and gave the plaintiff notice of it, she, Mrs. Bosworth, said
to him: "I don't know about your' making such presents!" to
which he replied, "I shouldn't think you need trouble yourself
about it; if anything happens to her, you will hold it."
The plaintiff claims to be entitled to the deposit, as money held
in trust for her by Levi Bosworth. The defendant, as administrator on Bosworth's estate, resists the claim. His answer to her
bill avers on information and belief that Bosworth made the
deposit in his name as trustee for his own convenience, and because
he had another deposit in his own name to as large an amount as
the bank would receive on -any one account, and therefore, to induce the bank to receive the further deposit, he put it in his name
as trustee, as is a very common practice in such cases, always
retaining the book under his own control. In support of this averment the defendant testified that Bosworth told him, when he was
building his house, that he had money deposited in the Fall River
Savings Bank, in his own name, to as large an amount as he could
deposit in his own name, and in another person's name, but did
not say in whose name. He also testified to conduct and admissions, on the part bf the plaintiff and her mother, at variance with
the plaintiff's present claim. We, however, refrain from reciting
this testimony, because, in view of the explanations given by Irs.
Bosworth, we are not prepared t6 believe that her testimony is
Substantially incorrect.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff is not entitled torelief, because there was no effectual trust, inasmuch as Bosworth, by retaining the book, always kept and intended to keep
control over the deposit for his own use, and did in fact so control it by receiving the dividend which was paid to him October
12th 1870.
We think, however, the trust was completely constituted. Levi
Bosworth deposited the money in the bank to himself as trustec.
The bank, receiving it, credit6d it to him as trustee, and, from
time to time, credited to him as trustee the dividends accruing
thereon. It gave him a bank-book in which these credits were
entered. Bosworth moreover communicated to the plaintiff the
fact that he had made the deposit to himself as her trustee by.
letting her have the book. It is urged that the book was returned
to him by her, and retained by him. But the book was given by
the bank to him as trustee, and as trustee he would properly re-
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tain it. All was done which the plaintiff could ask, unless she
desired to have the money paid or transferred to her, which would
be not constituting the trust, but carrying into effect and discharging it. Bosworth might have declared himself more explicitly;
but, supposing his object was to create a trust and make himself
the trustee, we can think of no act necessary to effect his purpose
which he has left undone.
When the trust is voluntary, courts of equity do not enforce it,
so long as it remains inchoate or incomplete ; b~t when once the
trust has been constituted, they do not refuse relief because it is
voluntary: Stone et al. v. Ifing et al., 7 R. I. 358. A person
need use no particular form of words to create a trhst, or to make
himself a trustee. It is enough if, having the property, he conveys
it to another in trust, or, the property being personal, if lie unequivocally declares, either orally or in writing, that he holds it in
presenti in trust or as a trustee for another: Ex parte Pye, 18
Yes. Jr. 140 ; l.l1ilroy v. Lord, 4 De G. F. & J. 264; Richardson
v. Richardson, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 686; Kekewich v. Manning, 1
De G. M. & G. 176; Morgan v. M11alleson, Law Rep. 10 Eq. 475;
Penfold v. Mould, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 562; Wheatley v. Purr, 1
Keen 551 and note; M'Fadden v. Jenklyns, 1 Hare 458; affirmed
on appeal, 1 Phillips 153; Thorpe v. Owen, 5 Beav. 224. And
the creation of the trust, if otherwise unequivocal, is not affected
by the settler's retention of the instrument of trust, especially
where he is himself the trustee: Exton v. Scott, 6 Sir. 31;
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare 67 ; Carson'sAdn'r v. Phelps, 14
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 100; Souverye et ux. v. Arden et als., 1
Johns. Oh. 240; Bunn v. Winthrop et als., 1 Johns. Ch. 329.
In
Iheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen 551, the settlor instructed her
bankers, with whom she had a deposit of 30001., to place 2000l.
in the joint names of the plaintiffs and her own, as trustee for the
plaintiffs. The sum of 20001. was entered by the bankers in their
books to the account of the settler as trustee for the plaintiffs, at.d
a promissory note given for it payable to the settler trustee for
the plaintiffs, or order, fourteen days after sight. A receipt for
this note was signed by the settler and given to the bankers. The
trust was held to be effectually vested. In our opinion, the case
is not distinguishable from the case at bar. Indeed, the case at
bar is stronger, in that notice of the trust was communicated to the
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cestui que trust. And see klillspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Ab. Pr.
380; 1toward, Adm'r, v. Savings Bank, 40 Vt. 597.
The counsel for the defendatit calls our attention to the declaration made by Mr. Bosworth while his house was building. The
declaration was casually made, and may have been misunderstood.
But, supposing it was correctly understood, we do not think we
can allow it to alter our decision. The trust, except in so far as
it was increased by subsequent deposits, was, in our opinion,
created before the declaration was made ; and no such declaratioll,
made after the creation of the trust, could have any legitimate
effect on it. The same is true in regard to the withdrawal of
the dividend. It may be remarked, also, that the dividend withdrawn was more than replaced by the seventy dollars afterwards
deposited.
The counsel for the defendant also calls our attention to the
cases of Brabrook v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 104 Mass.
228, and Clark v. Clark, 108 Id. 522. These are cases in
which A. deposited money in a savings bank in his own name as
trustee for B., but always retained thb bank-book, and never communicated to B. any notice of the deposit. They are cases at law.
The court ruled that B. was not entitled to the deposit, being
neither par'ty nor privy to the transaction. In one of the cases,
the court found, as a fact affirmatively proved, that no actual gift
or trust was intended. We do not think the cases are precedents
which should govern the decision of the case at bar.
The bill is against the defendant, as administrator on the estate
of Levi Bosworth. It alleges that the defendant, as administrator,
has withdrawn the deposit and now has it in his possession, and
refuses to pay it to the plaintiff. The answer alleges that the defendant was appointed administrator in Massachusetts, and as such
withdrew the deposit; but does not deny that he now holds it as
administrator in this state, but avers that he now holds the same
as a part of the estate of the decedent. From this we presume
that he holds it as administrator in this state. In this view, we
think the defendant may be held to account directly with the
plaintiff, and will decree accordingly.
Although the cases relating to the
general subject of gifts of chattels without actual delivery of the subject-matVOL. XXIV.-89

ter of the gift, may seem to warrant the
charge of inconsistency and confusion
in this branch of the law, a careful
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study of the facts of each case will
show that in most instances the incon-

that upon an agreement to transfer
stock, this court will not interpose. iut
sistency is more seeming than real. At if the party had declared himself to be
common law, actual delivery and trans- the trustee of that stock, it becomes the
mutation of possession was essential to
property of the estui qua tru.st without
the validity of the gift. In the claqs of
more, and the court will act upon it."
eases here to be noticed, by the applicaThe principles thfis stated, being once
tion of equitable principles in establishestablished, little difficulty has been
ing a trust relation without this actual
found in determining questions arising
delivery, the intentions of the donor
in cases of the first -class. The diffihave been effectuated.
culty in their applidation to cases of the
These cases naturally divide themsecond and third class arises from the
selves into 'three classes: 1. Where
uncertainty whether, in each special case,
there has been a formal written declaraa trust has been created. The criterion
tion of trust. 2. Where there has been
to be applied is, do'the Fitets warrant
no such formal declaration, but a trust
the belief that the donor intended to diis implied from the words and actions
vest himself immediately of all Ieneof the parties. 3. Where a formal asficial right, title, or interest in tie prosignment of a chose in action, though
perty given, and that he did everything
incapable of passing the legal title, has
which, considering the relation he tni"'ht,
been construed as a declaration of trust.
in each particular instance, bear to the
1. The cases of this class, though
donee, and the nature of the property
few, are important, because in them is
given, he could reasonably ice expected
first recognised the principle, that if the to do, to unmistakably evince such an
trust relation is clearly established,
intention.
equity will enforce it. although the
2. These cases of the second class
trust be voluntary. In Ellison v. ERi- may profitably be sub-divided accordEon,6 Ves. Jr. 656, Lord ELDoNt said : ing as time subject of the gift is a
"I take the distinction to be, that if
substantial chattel, or a chose in action.
Living animals have been the ,uljccts
you want the assistance of the court to
constitute yon ccstui qua trust and the of nearly all the controversies which
instrument is voluntary, you shall not
have arisen over alleged gifts of substantial chattels.
have that assistance for the purpose of
In J1id!ebrant v. Lwis, 6 Texas 45, a
constituting you cestui qua trust, as upon
father branded certain cattle with a
a covenant to transfer stock. &c., if it
brand recorded in the name of an infant
rests in covenant, and is purely volundaughter, accompanying his action with
tary, this'court will not execute that
voluntary covenant ; but if the party has declarations of a gift. The court held
that these acts evinced an unmistakable
completely transferred
stock,
&c.,
intention, and that all was done which
though it is voluntary, yet the legal
a father could do to complete a gift to
conveyance being effectually male, the
equitable interest will be enforced by his daughter, regarding his subsequent
possession as that of a trustee. 11What
this court." In Ex parte Pye, IS Ves.
Jr., the same judge said : "The queswill amount to a delivery must dependm
tion involved is, whether the power of
on the nature of the thing and the cirattorney here amounts to a declaration
cumstances of the case. Actual manual
of trust. It is clear that this court will
delivery is not in all cases necessary.
not assist a volunteer ; yet if the act is
Where the thing is incapable o actual
completed, though voluntary, the court
delivery-, or where the situation of the
will act upon it. It has been decided,
parties or the circumstances of the case
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will not admit of it, it may be symbolical or constructive. There may be circumstances undcr which a gift may lie
valid and complete, as between donor
and donee without delivery, and the
possession of the former will not be inconsistent with the right of the latter."
.Johnson v. S'even, 22 Louisiana An.
144, is distinguishable ftom this case,
becahse there it appeared that the father
when he branded the cattle had no present intention of giving them to his
daughter, but to please her, as the statement of fact reads, allowed them to be
called hers, ail have a special brand
placed upon them, intending finally to
give them to her. When her subsequent marriage displeased him, he
changed his purpose, ant the court held,
that there was no evidence that he had
ever manifested an intention to divest
himself of the property in them. In
Brink v. Gould, 7 Lans. 425, a mother,
owning two heifers, said to her daughter, then on a visit, "You may have
either of them, whichever you choose."
Tie heifers were not in sight; the
daughter made no reply, and nothing
more was said or done. The gift was
held to be incomplete, because in view
of the fact that the mother and daughter
were living apart, a transmutation of
possession would have been the natural
consequence of a completed gift.
Spencer v. Vance, 57 Missouri 427,
was decided on similar grounds, WAGER, J., saying: "It is essential to a
gift that it go into effect at once, and
completely. If it regards the future, it
is but a promise, and being a promise
without consideration, it cannot be enforced and his no legal validity."
Brewer v. Harvey, 72 North Car. 176,
is a case where a different judgment,
it would seem, might have been given
without stretching very far the doctrine
of a trust implied from the cots and,
relations of the parties. A father
pointed out a colt to his daughter, saying : " That is your property; I give it
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to you " The daughter was then living with her father, and remained so
until his death. Although the colt continued in the father's stable, it might
have fairly been said, that considering
the relation of parent and child, no actual change of possession could have
been expected. The attention of the
court does not appear to have been directed to the doctrino of the establishment of a trust, and -it may be presumed that it entirely escaped their consideration.
Craufiird's Appeal, 61 Penn. St. 52,
seems to hold that in cases of gifts
by husband to wife, or parent to child
living at home, the necessity for an
actual change of possession does not
exist; AGNEw, J., saying: "The title
of the wife to the $3000 credited to her
on her husband's books could not be
supported is an ordinary gift between
strangers. Where the gift 1s not executed by delivery, but the determining
act remains in fieri, the law gives no
force to the mere intention to do it.
But in this case, are not the facts sufficient to show an executed intention followed hy a trust ? The transaction was
between habhand and wife, and therefore
influenced by their peculiar relation.
ie came in and said to her. 'I have
added $3000 to your little money, and
after a while I am going to give you
$3000 more.' .He did not hand her the
money then, or at any time. But we
find the money credited as if actually
received, carried into an account of
moneys admitted to belong to- her,
mingled with it, interest credited upon
it, finally consolidated in the account,
and interest added on the total sum.
This is certainly ample evidence of an
executed gift, followed by an express
trust in the form of an account for it
and its accrued interest, remaining unrevoked or denied by the decedent up to
the time of his death. It cannot be
doubted then that Crawford intended to
fasten upon himself and his estate an

-
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admitted gift, and to become trustee of

question could have arisen regarding

the fund. It is true that there was no
formal passing of the money between
them, but this was a useless ceremony
between husband and wife, where there
is a clear executed intention to become
the trustee of the fund for her benefit.
In order to make such a formality
effective, a winess must be called to
see him hand the money to her and
straightway receive it back. But of
what greater efficacy would this be
than the husband's own admission in
his book, and his express direction to
hishookkeeper? The difference i clearly
one of the merest form, and not substance. Of what possible use can it be
to go through a mere ceremony where
the evident intent is to assume immediate possession as trustee?"
If the
court had applied these principles in
Brewer v. Harrey, supra, the daughter
probably would have kept her colt.
The principal case is one of several that have arisen in consequence
of the alleged gift of bank depositbobks.
These cases have been decided upon the same principle. The
question for inquiry has been, Has the
the donor clearly evinced his intention
to create a trust, an( has he done all
that he ought to have done to make that
trust relation complete ?
In 3Minor v. Roters, 40 Conn. 512, the
defendant's intestate deposited $250 in a
savings bank, receiving a deposit-book
made out in her own name, "Mary
Daniels, trustee of William A. Minor ;"
at the same time informing Minor's
father of her action, but before her
death drew out the deposit. In an action
by Minor against her administrator for
money had and received, the court said :
"It is evident that she did all that she
thought necessary to be done to perfect
the gift, and supposed that she had ac-

the completeness of the gift. But the
beneficial interest is as much given as it
would have been if either of these modes
had been adopted. The deposit is made
in the bank for the plaintiff, and the
bank is informed 6f the fact. Here is
a delivery of the beneficial interest.
No more would have been done if the
deposit had been made in the name of a
Camnp's
third party for the plaintiff."
Appeal, 36 Conn. 88, and ill v. Stev.:nson, 63 Maine 364, contained the additional fact that the books were actually
delivered to the dones, but the deposits
were simply made in tie name of the
donor. The gifts were sustained as
valid. In Blasdell v. Locke, 52 N. II.
238, the donor deposited money in a
savings bank, taking a book in the name
of her niece, and just before (lying informed her of tile gift, and in Howard
v. Indham Bank-, 40 Vt. 597, where
the facts were similar, except that the
donee did not know of the intende,1 gift,
the gifts were sustained. In Gardner
v. ,Merritt, 32 Md. 78, a deposit was
made by a grandmother in the name of
five minor grandchildren, but subject to
her order, or that of her daughter.
About the time of making tile deposit,
she said "she was going to put the
money in bank for the children."
After her death, her daughter drew it
out and administered it as part of tile
assets of tbe estate. In an action by
the grandchildren against the daughter
to recover the amounts of the deposits,
the court said : "A gift is inoperative
without delivery. To be valid it can
have no reference to the future, but
must go into immediate and absolute
effect. To the perfection of a parol
gift of a chattel, delivery is necessary,
and without actual delivery no title
passes. The delivery may be to the
donee, or to any bailee of the donee ; all
these conditions were met in this case.
The money was delivered by the donor
to the bank as bailec of the infants,

complished the object. If she had made
the deposit in the name of the plaintiff
alone, or had made some other person
than herself trustee for the plaintiff, no
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with the direction that it should be entered to their credit in accounts standing open in their names. The delivery
to the bank for the benefit of the grandchildren was a perfected gift to them,
and the control retained by her or her
(laughter was a control for the benefit
of those for whose use the money was
delivered, and not such control as would
pertain to a continuing legal power and
dominion over it, which would leave the
donor a locus pnitentke." In full
accord with these cases are .fillspaugh
v. Putnam, 16 Abb. Pr. 380, and IVeaftley v. Purr, I Keen 551. In Bland v.
MfcCullough, 9 Weekly Rep. 65, A.
from time to time purchased debentures
to the amount of 30001., and gave them
into the custody of B., who lived with
him as a wife, B. also, as they were
purchased, from time to time received
the stockbroker's receipts, and cut off
the coupons as they matured, and accompanied A. to receive the dividends.
A. had promised B. the debentures
before they were purchased, and subsequently acknowledged and alluded to
them as hers. Vice-Chancellr STUAIT
held this to be a completed gift. For
cases where under doubtful circumstances alleged gifts have been sustained,
see Penfidd v. Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith
305, and Lemon v. Ins. Co., 38 Conni 294.
McFaddn v. Jnkcyns, I Phillips 153,
established the proposition that a declaration of trust may be implied without
any evidence of it in writing. A.
shortly before his death sent a verbal
message to B., his debtor, desiring him
to hold the debt in trust for C. B. accdpted the trust, and the transaction
was communicated to C. both by A. and
B. Upon a bill in equity being filed by
C. to restrain A.'s executors from collecting the debt from B., Lord LYNDMUST said: "A. in directing B. to
hold the money in trust for C., which
was assented to and acted upon by B.,
impressed, I think, a trust upon the
money which was complete and irre-

vocable. It was equivalent to a declaration h~vA. that the debt was a trust for
C. The transaction hears no resemblance to an undertaking or agreement
to assign. It was In terms a trust, and
the aid of the court was not necessary
to complete it."
The principles upon which these
cases rest, and what are the requisites
and evidence of a complete declaration of trust, will be better understood
when certain cases are considered
where alleged gifts have been held
invalid because they lacked some such
requisite, or the evidence of a cotnpleted declaration failed. In Trimmer
v. Danby, 25 Law Jour. Ch. 424, upon
the death of a testator ten Austrian
bonds were found, among other securities, in a box at his house with the following indorsement : "The first five
numbers of these Austrian bonds belong
to and are H. D.'s property," signed
by the testator. H. 1. was his housekeeper, and had the key of the box in
her custody. Vice-Chancellor KIxDnESLEY said: "These bonds are capable of being transferred by hand,
and as there was no actual delivery I
mfist treat them as part of the assets of
the estate." In this case it will be perceived that there was- no reason why the
testator, if he had intended to give the
bonds to H. D., should not have actually
delivered thei6. If there is any suspicion that an alleged gift was not to
have an immediate effect, or if the
donor does not do all that might be expected of one under the same circumstances to evince that such was his intention, the intended gift must fail.
The facts of Murray v. Cannon, 41
Md. 466, bear some resemblance to
those in Gardner v. Merritt, supra, and
the court, judging from their opinion, do
not seem to have had that case called
to their attention, else certain expressions in the opinion would have been
modified. J. C. opened an account in
a savings bank " to the credit of J. C.,
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subject to his own order or to the order
of M. E. C.," his daughter, to whom
the deposit-book was given, with the
statement that it was for herself and
her brothers and sisters. It will be
seen that no trust was expressed in the
deposit-book, and it also appeared that
the bank had no notice of the interest
of the alleged donees. This clearly
distinguished the two cases on principle,
and the court held that no trust could be
implied from the evidence of the statements of J. C. and placing the book in
the hands of his daughter. The mere
possession of a mortgage, together with
loose statements of the mortgagee importing a gift to the holder, is not sufficient evidence of a gift to enable such
holder to maintain an action upon the
mortgage :Johnson v. Spies, 5 Hun 468.
The evidence that the acts and declarations of the donor imported a present
gift, and not an intention to make one
in the future, must be clear : T$!or v.
Staples, 8 R. I. 170. Lord CRAwwonTI!,
in Scales v. Maude, 6 De Gex, Al. & G.
43, was led into certain expressions,
which he subsequently inJones v. Locke,
L. R. 1 Ch. 25, repudiated, as not a true
exposition of the law. The correctness
of the decision in the case, however, remains unquestioned. In Sdesv.Maude,
the true ground upon which the decision
should have been put was that the gift
was testamentary, and that there never
was a complete declaration of trust.
Lord CRANWORTI1, however, said, and
this is what he subsequently repudiated :
" Even if it were a declaration of trust,
it would be invalid for want of consideration. A mere declaration of trust by
the owner of property in favor of a volunteer, is inoperative, and this court will
In Jones
not interfere in such a case."
v. Locke, a father put a check into the
hand of his infant son, nine months old,
saying : ' I give this to baby for him'
self, and then took back the check, and
put it in his safe, saying to his wife, " I
am going to put this away for my son."

Lord CRANwonTIt said : "This is a
special case, in which I regret to say
that I cannot bring myself to think that
either on principle or on authority
there has been any gift or valid declaration of trust. No doubt a gift may be
made by any person sui juris and coinpos
Iaentis, by conveyance of real estate, or
by delivery of a chattel, and there is no
doubt, also, that by some decisions, unfortunate I must -think them, a parol
declaration of trust of personalty may
be perfectly valid, even when voluntary. If I give any chattel, that, of
course, passes by delivery, and if I say,
expressly or impliedly, that I constitute myself a trustee of personalty, that
is a trust executed, and capable of being enforced without consideration. I
do not think it necessary to go into any
of the authorities cited before me ; they
all turn upon the question, whether what
has been said was a declaration of trust
or an imperfect gift. In the latter case,
the parties would receive no aid from a
court of equity if they claimed as volunteers. But when there has been a
declaration of trust, then it will be enforced, whether theie has been consideration or not. Therefore, the question
in each case is one of fact. Has there
been a gift or not; or has there been a
declaration of trust or not ? I should
have every inclination to sustain this
gift, but unfortunately I am unable to
do so. The case turns on the very short
question whether Jones intended to
make a declaratiou that he held the property in trust for the child, and I cannot come to any other conclusion titan
that he did not. I think it would be
of very dangerous example if loose conversations of this sort in important
transactions of this kind should have
the effect of declarations of trust."
lWarriner v. Rogers, L. R. 16 Eq. 340,
contains a careful analysis of complicated facts by Vice Chancellor ]B,3cox,
wherein the difference between a completed declaration of trust and decla-
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rations of testamentary intent are clearly
set forth.
3. ,Thcre are cases in which voluntary written assignments or settlements
of choses in action have been sustained
as declarations of trust upon the principle that a declaration of trust is not
confinled to any form of words, but may
be inlicated by the character of the instrument. In these cases it is not necessary that there should be any actual
transfer of the legal estate ; the essential act is that the gift be perfected and
complete, resting neither in promise nor
unfulfilled intention. In Kekewidi v.
Manning, I Do Gex, M1.& G. 176, kiss.
Kekewich being on the point of marrying Sir Henry Farrington, made A settlement of property, in trust, for the use'
of herself, husband, and the issueof the
marriage, with remainder over to certain volunteers. The husband died,
leaving no issue, whereupon Lady F.
made a new settlement for a valuable
consideration, the objects of which were
different from those of the first. The
remainder-men in the first settlement
filed a bill in equity to enforce its trusts.
The Lords Justices held, that they were
entitled to the relief they asked, L. J.
KNIGHT BRUCE saying: "It

is proba-

bly, or certainly in some instances, the
course of this jurisdiption to decline acting at the suit of those whom it terms volunteers, though within that description
a person claiming directly and merely
under a gratuitous promise, oral or not
under seal, which is nudum pactuna, may
be thought perhaps hardly to come, for
such a person has in effect had no promise at all. In effect, no contract has
been made with him. But whatever
rule there may be against ' volunteers,'
it does not apply to the case of one who,
in the language of this court, is termed
a cestui que trust, claiming against his
trustee. For that which is considered
by this jurisdiction a trust may certainly
be created gratuitously. So that the
absence of consideration for its creation
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is in general absolutely immaterial."
In Russell's Apped, 75 Penn. St. 269,

the facts were almost identical with
KdH:ew.c v. .31onaing. A woman, in
contemplation of marriage, conveyed
her estate to trustees for the use of herself during life, then for her children
according to her testamentary appointment, with remainder over in default of
issue to her brothers and sisters. The

husband having died first without issue,
the settlor'filed a bill to revoke the trust,
and ,the court, while assenting to the
. fieral principlds as settled in Kelxwich
, - .. fannng and other cases, hcld that
-thd purpos"f the trust having failed,
tie absence of a power of revocation in
.tie deed was under the circumstances a
mistake which entitled the settlor to relier, and accordingly ordered the trustees
to reconvey to the settlor in fee. In
Richardson v. Richurd n, L. 1. 3 Eq.

686, E., by voluntary deed, assigned
certain specific property, and "all other
the personal estate whatsoever and
wheresoever'! of her, the said E., to R.
absolutely; at the time of this assignment, B. was possessed of, amongst
other property, certain promissory notes
which were not mentioned specifically
in the deed. Upon R.'s death these
notes were found in his possession, but
not endorsed to him ; there was no evidence as to any delivery of the notes by
icid, that the assignment
E. to R.
operated as a good declaration of trust.

Referring to Kekewich v. Manning, Vice
Chanc. W. PAGE Wood said : "After
that decision, I think it is impossible to
contend that these notes did not pass by
this instrument, because the rule laid
down in that case, the decision in which
was supported by reference to Ex parle
Pye, 18 Ves. Jr. 140, was not confined
merely to this, that a person who, being entitled to a reversionary interest,
or to stock standing in another's name,
assigns it by a voluntary deed, thereby
passes it, notwithstanding that he does
not in formal termi declare himself to
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be a trustee of the property; but it
amounts to this, that an instrument executed as a present and complete assignment (not being a mere covenant to
assign on a future day) is equivalent to
a declaration of trust. The good sense
of the decision I think lies in this, that
th real "distinction should be made between an agreement to do something
when called upon, something distinctly
expressed to be future in the instrument,
and an instrument which affects to pass
everything independently of the legal
estate.". Licey v. Licell, 7 Barr 251,
was a case somewhat similar in principle. A bond was delivered by an obligee to an obligor, to do with it what he
pleased, and the act was sustained as a
completed gift. In Bond v. Bunting, 78
Penn. St. 210, Martha Bond took out
a policy of insurance upon the life of
her husband. The day before his
death, he joined her in an assignment, under seal, of the policy in
trust, as to part of the proceeds for
certain children of his by a former
marriage. Notice of the assignment
was immediately given to the trustees.
The trust was upheld upon the principles
stated in the foregoing cases, SItswooD, J., saying : "Delivery in this,
as in every other case, must be according
to the fiature of the thing ; it must be
secundum subjectum materamn, and be the
true and effectual way of obtaining the
command and dominion of the subject.
If the thing be not capable of actual
delivery, there must be some act equivalent to it. The donor must part not
only with the possession, but with the
dominion of the property. If the tiling
given be a chose in action, the law required an assignment, or some equivalent instrument, and the transfer must
be actually executed. To hold otherwise would be in effect to decide that
the owner of a chose in action, not evidenced by a note or bond, or other instrument, could not make a gift of it,
which would be an unreasonable limita-

tion of the right of property. It is
certainly the tendency of F.11tile modern
authorities to maintain the gec ral
doctrine which may, indeed, he stated
as a formula, that wherever a party has
the power to do a thing, statute provisions being out of the way, and means
to do it, the instrument he employs
shall be so construed as to give effect to
his intention. It cannot be doubted
that Mr. and Mrs: Bond could, by a
declaration of trust under seal, have constituted themselves trustees for the purposes set forth in the instrument, and
why, if it cannot, forwnant of consideration, operate as a good equitable assignment, may it not be effectual as a
declaration of trust?"
Morgan v. f.llon, L. R. 10 Eq.
475, comes very close to the line,
and has been criticised in some later
cases. The facts, however, seem to
S. signed the
warrant the decision.
following memorandum : " I hereby
give and make over to Dr. Morris an
*IndiaBond, No. D. 506, value 10001.,
as some token for all his very kind attention to me during illness. Witness
my hand this 1st day of August 1868.
(Signed) John Saunders." This memorandum was handed over to Dr. Morris, but the bond remained in the possession of S. It was held to be a valid
gift. The distinction between this case
and Trimmer v. Danbh, supra, is that
the assignment was delivered to the
donee in the one case,while in the other it
was not. Distinguishable from Ijondv.
Bunting for the same reason is Trough's
.Estate, 75 Penn. St. 115, and Znv. Strceper, Id. 147. If the
,rnen
subject-matter of the intended gift be
shares of stock in a company whose
charter or by-laws require certain formalities to make the transfer effectual,
it is essential that the prescribed formalities be complied with. The reason
seems to be that the donor has failed to
do all which might be expected of him
to make his intended gift complete:
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Searle v. Law, 15 Sim. 95 ; 3fdroy v.
Lord, 4 Dc Gex, F. & J. 264. Several
English decisions also require that notice of the assignment be given to the
trustee, if one is named: iletk v. Kettlewdl, I Hare 464 ; and if there is no
trustee named, then to the cestui que
trust: Edwards v. Jones, I M. & C.
226.. The burden of showing the completed character of the gift is upon the
donee, and if the case is doubtful upon

the facts, the gift cannot be sustained :
Antrobus v. Siniti, 12 Vesey Jr. 39.
The facts of Kennedy v. W1are, I Barr
445, are not clearly stated in the report,
and as the law is undoubtedly as stated
in the opinion, in the absence of a trust
relation, and as no mention is made of
the establishment of a trust relation, it
must be presumed that there was nothing in the facts to warrant such an bypothesis.
R. C. D., Jn.

Supreme Judicial Court f New Jfampshire.
ROWE v. PORTSMOUTH.
A city, having power by statute to construct public sewers, and to demand and
receive pay from adjoining owners for liberty to enter their private drains into such
sewers, is responsible for negligently suffering them to occasion a nuisance to the
estates of such adjoining owners, if the nuisance does not result from the original
plan of construction, and could be avoided by keeping them in proper condition.
In maintaining such public sewer, a city is bound to use that degree of care and
prudence which a discreet and cautious individual would use if the whole loss or
risk was to be his alone.
A city will not be liable for injuries caused to individuals, by an obstruction in
such public sewer not placed there by its own officials or by authority of the city
government, until after actual notice of such obstruction, or until, by reason of the
lapse of time, actual notice may be presumed.
CASE to recover damages sustained from a flow of water into
the cellar of the plaintiff's house from the defendants' common

sewer. Plea, the general issue. The case was referred to a referee, under the statute, who reported the following facts as proved :
Prior to the month of July 1872, the defendants, for more than
twenty years, had a common sewer leading from High street down
through Hanover street by the plaintiff's dwelling-house, and
emptying into the North Mill-pond, and the plaintiff's cellar, was
drained by a private drain leading into the defendants' common
sewer of right. In 1867 a new tile drain was laid by the plaintiff in place of her old one of wood, which was discontinued, and
said new tile drain led into the defendants' sewer. In 1867 the
defendant3 built a new common sewer in place of their old one,
which was discontinued, of cement stone pipe one foot in diameter,
laying the same outside of the old sewer, nearer to the plaintiff's
dwelling-house, and, in consequence, cut off all the private drains
VoL. XXIV.-90

ROwV v. PORTSMOUTH.

leading into the old sewer, and connected them with the new
sewer, including the plaintiff's drain, that the defendants, in laying said new sewer, a short distance below the place where the
plaintiff's drain entered it, found a water-pipe, one inch in dianeter, running across the proposed course of their sewer at right
angles, and they cut their sewer-pipe so as to let it down
over said water-pipe, so that the said water-pipe passed through
the centre of said sewer-pipe. It is provided by ordinance of said
city "that the city councils shall have power to. construct drains
and common sewers through highways, streets," &c., "and may
require all persons to pay a reasonable sum for the right to open
any drain into any public drain or common sewer.'
In the month of July 1872, by reason of a lady's parasol or
sunshade floating down said sewer and catching on said water-pipe,
said sewer became obstructed and choked up, so that on July 4th,
after a shower, the water flowed back from said obstruction through
the plaintiff's drain into her cellar, causing her damage and annoyance; and so, likewise, at three different times thereafter during
the month of July, at the last of which times, by reason of there
being a very heavy shower, and by reason of the said defendants'
common sewer having become more choked and obstructed .at said
water-pipe, the plaintiff's cellar was nearly filled with mud and
water, her provisions and produce destroyed, and -the cellar and
house damaged. The plaintiff each time notified the city marshal,
who lived in her neighborhood; but it did not appear in evidence
whether or not the marshal notified any other city officer until the
last time, when he notified the mayor and one of the aldermen,
and thereupon the defendants proceeded to examine their said
sewer, and found and removed the obstruction aforesaid. Said
obstruction would not have happened had said water-pipe not been
allowed to run through the defendants' said sewer; but said seiver,
as constructed, was sufficient for the purpose of carrying off the
water had said obstruction not occurred as above stated. There
was no evidence to show in what manner said parasol or sunshade
entered said sewer. Upon the foregoing facts the referee found
that the defendants were guilty in manner and form as the plaintiff had declared against them, and assessed damages in the sum
of $253.80.
Upon the return of said report the plaintiff moved for judgment
thereon in her favor for the amount found by the referee, and
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the court Iro forma granted the motion, to which the defendants
excepted.
The questions arising on the forgoing statement of facts and
ruling of the court were transferred to this court by STAxLEY, J.
Trinlk, for the plaintiff.
lodydon, for the defendants.
SMITH, J.-The defendants raise three questions upon the report
of the referee : (1) That no action will lie against a city for neglect
to build or repair a sewer ; (2) That if such action will lie, a city
is answerable only for neglect to use ordinary vigilance and care
to keep its sewers open and free from obstruction ; and (3) that
the defendants (lid not receive seasonable notice of the obstruction
to prevent the injuries which the plaintiff has received.
By ch. 44, see. 9, Gen. Stats., it is provided that "city councils
shall have power to construct drains and common sewers through
highiways, streets, or private lands, paying the owners such damages as they shall sustain thereby, said damages to be assessed by
the mayor and aldermen in the same manner and with the same
right of appeal from their decision as in case of the laying out of
highways; and may require all persons to pay a reasonable sum
for the right to open any drain into any public drain or common
sewer." This section is an exact re-enactment of section 21 of the
act to establish the city of Portsmouth, approved July 6th 1849,
under the authority of which the defendants must have rebuilt
their sewer in Hanover street in the year 1867, the General Statutes not taking effect till January 1st 1868. The statute authorized and empowered the defendants to construct public sewers,
but did not impose that duty upon them. It was optional with
th defendants whether they would or would not take the benefit
thus conferred upon them. This authority the defendants accepted
when they accepted their charter in 1848, under the provisions of
section 28; and it needs no argument to show that a city which
constructs sewers under the authority of a statute, virtually
accepts the power therein conferred, and will not be admitted to
allege the contrary. This case, therefore, is not to be distinguished from Child v. Boston, 4 Allen 41, upon the question of
acceptance by the defendants of the Mtatute conferring the authority to construct sewers. When, then, the defendants made their
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election by accepting the Act of 1849, and by executing the powers
therein granted, and also granted by the General Statutes, and
received pay from the plaintiff for opening her drain into their
public sewer, the question arises whether they are liable to her for
injuries sustained by her by reason of their neglect to keep their
sewers in proper repair.
Under what circumstances a municipal corporation will be held
liable to an individual suffering injuries from the neglect of such
corporation to perform a public duty, was very fully discussed by
PERLEY, C. J., in Eastman v. IlIeredith, 36 N. I. 284. In that
case it was decided that though a town-house, which was erected
by the town, was so defectively constructed that when a town meeting was held in it the floor broke down and a voter was thereby
injured, yet he could not maintain an action against the town to
recover damages for the injury. But the learned chief justice
remarks: "Grants are sometimes made to particular towns or
cities of special powers not belonging to them under the general
law ; and there is a class of cases in which towns and cities have
been held liable to civil actions for damages caused by neglect to
perform public duties growing out of the grant of such special
powers--as the power to bring water by an aqueduct for public
use by those who pay a compensation for it, to light the place with
gas on the same terms, or to make and maintain sewers at the
expense of adjoining proprietors. Thus, in The Mayor, ,yc., of
-NewYork in Error v. -urze, 3 Hill 612, the city was empowered
by special act to lay down and maintain sewers, and charge the
expense upon owners and occupiers of houses and lots intended to
be benefited; and it was held that .an individual might maintain
an action against the city to recover damages for a private injury
which he had suffered from neglect of the city to keep the sewers
in proper repair. The distinction between the liability of towns
and cities for neglect to perform public duties growing out of the
powers which they exercise under the general law, and their liability when the duty arises from the grant of some special power
conferred on the particular town or city, is recognised or explained
in Bailey v. Mayor, &c., of . ew York, 3 Hill 531."
Judge PERLEY further says, page 293, "In such cases the special
powers thus granted are not held by the particular town or city
under the general law, and as one of the political divisions of the
country. The public duty grows out of the special grant of power,
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and, though held and exercised by a town or city, the nature of the
power granted is the same as if a like power had been conferred
on a private corporation created to answer the same public object;
and the cases above referred to hold the town or city liable to a
civil action for neglect to perform a public duty arising from the
grant of the special power in the same way, and, as I understand
them, upon the same grounds and reasons as private corporations
are held, which are clothed with the same powers and bound to the
performance of the same public duties. So far as I have had
opportunity to examine this class of cases, they appear to go upon
the ground that the special power, though no direct pecuniary
profit may be derived from it, is granted as an immunity and
peculiar privilege for the benefit of the particular town or city, and
is accepted, as in the case of a private corporation, upon the implied condition of performing the public duties imposed by and
growing out of it: Henley v. Lyme Regis, 1 fBing. N. 0. 222;
Mears v. Wilmzngton, 9 Ired. 78; Mayor, &c., of New fYork v.
Bailey, 2 Den. 456."
It is well settled that a private action cannot be maintained
against a town, or other quasi corporation, for a neglect of corporate duty, unless such action be given by statute: Riddle v.
Proprietorsof Locks J" Canals, 7 Mass. 187 ; 3Tower v. Zeicester,
9 Id. 247. "This rule of law, however, is of limited application.
It is applied, in case of towns, only to the neglect or omission of a
town to perform those duties which are imposed on all towns without their corporate assent, and exclusively for public purposes, and
not to the neglect of those obligations which a town incurs when
a special duty is imposed on it with its consent, express or implied,
or a special authority is conferred on it at its request. In the
latter cases, a town is subject to the same liabilities for the neglect
of those special duties to which private corporations would be if
the same duties were imposed or the same authority were conferred
on them, including their liability for the wrongful neglect as well
as the wrongful acts of their officers and agents :" Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray 541.
Mild v. Boston, 4 Allen 41, is a case much in point, where it
was held that sewers when constructed become the property of the
city, and the duty of keeping them in repair devolves on the city ;
and the city is responsible for negligently suffering them to occasion a nuisance to the estates of the citizens whose private drains
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enter into them, if the nuisance does not result from their original
plan of construction, and could be avoided by keeping them in proper condition. The plaintiff's drain entered the defendants' common
sewer, which had its outlet in the south bay at the depth of some
feet below high water. By means of a waste-weir, the sewer was
constructed to discharge into the empty basin in the back bay when
the outlet into the south bay was closed by the tide, and the water
in the sewer had risen high enough to reach the waste-weir. The
proprietors filled in against the sewer in the back bay, thereby
preventing the discharge through the waste-weir, and tile plaintiff's premises were flowed in consequence.

HOAR, J., remarked:

"Here a special authority was conferred and accepted, involving
important relations to individual proprietors of land, and entire
control of an easement of such a nature that negligence might
not only deprive those interested of a benefit which it was designed to afford, and for which they had paid, but produce consequences actively and directly pernicious. The duty to keep the
sewer free from obstructions was a ministerial duty, and the dcfendants were liable for negligence in its exercise to any person to
whom their negligence occasioned an injury."
Judge COOLEY, in his work on Constitutional Limitations, page
248, says: " The grant by the state to the municipality of a portion of its sovereign powers, and their acceptance for these beneficial
purposes, is regarded as raising an implied promise on the part of
the corporation to perform the corporate duties; and this implied
contract, made with the sovereign power, enures to the benefit of
every individual interested in its performance. In this respect
these corporations are looked upon as occupying the same position
as private corporations, which, having accepted a valuable franchise on condition of the performance of certain public duties, are
held to contract, by the acceptance, for the performance of those
duties." The authorities are very unanimous in support of this
doctrine, and are cited on page 248 of Judge COOLEY'S work.

As to the second and third questions raised by the defendants,
the rule in such cases is stated in Roelester lite -Lead Co. v.
Rochester, .3 N. Y. 463, to be, that "a city is bound to exercise that
care and prudence which a discreet and cautious individual would
or ought to use if the whole loss or risk were to be his alone." In
Rue v. The 1iiayor, ,'e.. of Nbew York, 47 N. Y. 639, it is qaid:
"The city authorities are not bound to be experts, or skilled in
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mcclanics and architecture, and can only be held to the extent of
rcasonable intelligence and ordinary care and prudence :" Bockwood v. Wilson, 11 Cush. 221. In Johnson v. Javerhill,35 N.
II. 74, which was an action against the town for an injury resulting from an alleged defect in a highway, it was held that the question of negligence on the part of the town does not arise except
incidentally, as it is involved in the question whether the defect
exists, and this latter question may depend upon the manner in
which the defect originated, and the circumstances of its continuance. In such case the question of negligence is a material
inquiry. And where an obstruction exists by reason of inevitable
accident, without fault or negligence on the part of any person, it
is not an obstruction within the meaning of the statute, unless the
town had notice of it, express or implied, and reasonable opportunity, by the exercise of proper care and vigilance, to have removed it before the accident occurred. It is well settled, that a
municipal corporation is not liable for injuries caused to individuals
by obstructions on the highway not placed there by its own officials
or by authority of the city government, until after actual notice
of their existence, or until, by reason of the lapse of time, it should
have had knowledge, and therefore actual notice maybe presumed:
Hurme v. New Fork, 47 N. Y. 646; Colley v. Westbrook, 57 Me.
181; Hunt v. Brooklyn, 85 Barb. 226 ; Cooley, page 249.
The case does not show that the referee did not apply these rules
in weighing the evidence laid before him, and in coming to the
conclusion which lie reached. " We cannot say, as matter of law,
from the facts presented by the report, that the-defendants did
act with the care and prudence that a discreet and cautious individual would if the whole loss or risk were to be borne by him
alone. There is evidence tending to show that the thing which
caused the obstruction in the sewer had been there for such a
length of time that notice to the defendants must be presumied.
But these were questions of fact, to be found by the referee according to the particular circumstancesof this case : Johnson v. Haverhill, supra; and it is to be presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that he applied the law correctly to the facts.
CUSHING, 0. J.-The case of Eastman v. Heredith was very
elaborately and carefully considered by the late Chief Justice
PERIEY. From that case, and the authorities cited by my brother
SMITH, it seems to me well established that this is ond of that class
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of cases in which a corporation would be liable at common law for
a neglect of its duty.
Some question has been made in the argument about the sufficiency of the notice to the city of the defect in the sewer, and it is
claimed that the city marshal was not the proper officer to receive
the notice. In the case of Howe v. Plainfield,41 N. H. 135,
which was an action for damages occasioned by a defect in a highway, the defendants offered to show that the selectmen had no
notice of the defect. -The testimony was excluded, and it was held
to have been rightly excluded, the court putting the matter upon
the ground that, if the defect had existed for a sufficient length
of time to give reasonable opportunity to ascertain and repair it,
the town was liable, whether the selectmen had notice, express or
implied, of its existence or not. The true theory of the law seems
to be, that, in matters of this kind, every corporator ought to interest himself in taking notice of defects and bringing them to the
knowledge of the authorities, and that whenever the jury is in
condition to say that the corporation ought to have taken notice,
it will be held liable. I think we must infer that the referee
found, from the notice to the city marshal, which tended to give
notoriety, from the length of time which had elapsed, and from all
the circumstances, that the defendants had been guilty of neglect.
I think, therefore, there should be judgment for the plaintiff on
the report.
LADD, J.-I,
also, think there should be judgment on the report
for the plaintiff. Certain facts were reported by the referee, for
what purpose does not very clearly appear, and judgment was
rendered by the court below for the plaintiff in accordance with
the general finding of the referee. The defendants excepted to
the order for judgment against them. I understand the ground
they take to be, first, that there was no evidence from which the
referee could legally find that the damage was caused by any want
of reasonable and ordinary care on the part of the city with
respect to the sewer; and, second, that if there was such evidence,
still they are not liable, according to the doctrine of Bastman v.
4feredith, 36 N. I. 284.
The first position is certainly without foundation. It is entirely
clear that there was evidence from which the referee might well
find fault and negligence in the original construction of the

ROWE v. PORTSMOUTH.

sewer, and negligence in not removing the obstruction before the
injury happened.
The second point is undoubtedly one of more intrinsic difficulty.
The defendants were not bound by law to construct the sewer, and
herein the case differs entirely from that of an injury caused by a
defect in a highway. They were, however, authorized to construct
it, and voluntarily undertook that service. The plaintiff's cellar
was drained into the sewer "of right," as the case finds; so there
is no pretence that her legal rights had been forfeited or impaired
by her own act. It does not appear whether this right to drain
her cellar into the common sewer was of such a character that
she could compel the defendants to keep up the sewer for that
purpose, nor whether the right was obtained by the payment of a
reasonable sum to the city, as provided by Gen. Stats., ch 44, see.
9; but, in the view I take of the case, neither of these things is
material. It is material that she did not, without right, open her
drain into the sewer.
As to the application of Eastman v. Meredith, it appears to me
the cases are not parallel. There it was held, that where a building, erected by a town for a town house, was so imperfectly constructed that the flooring gave way at the annual town meeting,
and an inhabitant and legal voter, in attendance on the meeting,
received thereby a bodily injury, he could not maintain an action
against the town to recover damages for the injury.
The decision was placed entirely on the peculiar nature of the
obligation of a town to provide a safe place in which to hold town
meetings. That duty is not imposed by statute, nor by contract.
It is not an enterprise undertaken by the town for gain. It is
at most a public or political duty, and the right of the citizen that
it shall be properly performed is a public or political right.
The court say: "We regard the present case as one of new
impression. We have heard of no earlier attempt in this state to
maintain an action against a town for a private injury suffered by
a citizen of the town from neglect of the town to provide him with
safe and suitable means of exercising his public rights, and we are
not informed of any case in which such an action has been maintained in any other state."
Nearly the whole of the elaborate opinion of the court is occupied
.VOL. XXIV.-91
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with showing the distinctions between that case and cases bearing
a very strong resemblance to the present.
The question, whether municipal corporations in this country
and corporations in England having some of the powers and
charged with some of the duties usually exercised by municipal
corporations here, are liable for negligence, carelessness, or misfeasance, both in. the performance of their legal duties and the
doing of voluntary acts within the scope of their authority, has
been much considered by the courts on both sides of the Atlantic;
and the decided weight of modern authority is, that in this respect
they stand like private individuals or corporations. The Englisli
cases on this subject are very thoroughly and carefully reviewed
by BLACKBURN, J., in Mersey Docks Trustee8 v. ibb8, Law Rep.
1 Il. L. 93. That was an action against the Mersey Docks Board
of Trustees, a corporation created by Act of Parliament, with
power to build docks at Liverpool and secure dock rates, which
rates they were bound by the statute to apply wholly to the maintenance of the docks and the payment of a very large debt contracted in making them. The plaintiff's vessel, while entering one
of the docks, ran upon a bank of mud which had been suffered to
accumulate at the entrance of the dock, and was damaged. It
was held that the .principle on which a private person, or a company, is liable for damages occasioned by the neglect of servants,
applies to a corporation which has been entrusted by statute to
perform certain works, and to receive tolls for the use of those
works, although those tolls, unlike the tolls received by the private
person or the company, arc not applicable to the use of the individual corporators, or to that of the corporation, but are devoted
to the maintenance of the works, and, in case of any surplus existing, the tolls themselves are to be proportionately diminished.
This case, decided in 1866, shows most clearly the state of the
law in England on this point at the present time, and is very much
in point.
There was evidence here from which the referee might find want
of due care in the construction of the sewer, and that the damage
happened by reason thereof.
In The lfayoi', J'c., of New York v. Bailey, 2 Den. 433, it was
held that a municipal corporation is responsible for the negligence
or unskilfulness of its agents and servants, when employed. iri the
construction of a work for the benefit of the city or town, subject
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to the government of such corporation. The action was for injury
occasioned by the negligent and unskilful construction of a dam
on the Croton river, being part of the public works built pursuant
to a statute for supplying the city with pure and wholesome
water.

In Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochfester, 3 N. Y. 463, the
corporation of the city of Rochester, having power to cause common sewers, drains, &c., to be made in any part of the city,
directed a culvert to be built, for the purpose of conducting the
water of a natural stream which had previously been the outlet
through which the surface water of a portion of the city had been
carried off. A freshet having occurred, the culvert, in consequence
of its want of capacity and the unskilfulness of*its construction,
failed to discharge the waters, so that they were set back upon
the factory of the plaintiffs, and injured their property situated
therein. ifeld, that the city corporation was liable for the damages. And the doctrine was laid down, that an ordinance of a
city corporation, directing the construction of a work within the
general scope of its powers, is a judicial act for which the corporation is not responsible; but the prosecution of the work is minis"terial in its character, and the corporation must therefore see that
it is done in a safe and skilful manner.
There was also, in the present case, as already suggested, evidence from which the referee might find negligence in not re'moving the obstruction from the sewer before the injury occurred;
and my opinion is, that this also furnishes legal ground upon which
the award of the referee should be sustained.

The case of The Mkayor, &c., of New York v. Furze, 3 Hill 612,
is in point. It was there held that the corporation of the city of
New York are bound to repair the sewers, &c., constructed by
them ; and' if an inhabitant be injured by reason of their neglect
in this particular, he may maintain an action against them for
his damages.
Another strong case of the same description is Child v. Boston,
4 Allen 41, where the city was held responsible for negligently
suffering the common sewers to occasion a nuisance in the estates
of the citizens whose private drains enter into them. A large number of cases bearing in the same direction may be found in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, sects. 120, 144, 151, 579.
The point as to want of due care and skill in the original con-
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struction was decided by this court in the recent case of Gilnan v.
Laconia, 55 N. H. 130.
I think the defendants were bound to the exercise of ordinary
care and skill, both in constructing and maintaining the sewer, and
that for any injury which happens to the estate of a citizen from
a failure in that respect, they are responsible.
Judgment on the report for the plaintiff.

Supreme Court of the United State.
NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. WILLIAM C.STATHAM ET AL.
THE SADIE v. CHARLOTTE SEYMS.
MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO. v. R. S. BUCK, EXECUTOR.
A policy of lire insurance which stipulates for the payment of an annual premium by the assured, with a condition to be void on non-payment, is not an insurance from year to year, like a common fire policy ; but the premiums constitute
an annuity, the whole of which is the consideration for the entire assurance for
life ; and the condition is a condition subsequent, making void the policy by its
non-performance.
But the time of payment in such policies is material, and of the essence of the
contract; and failure to pay involves an absolute forfeiture, which cannot be
relieved against in equity.
If failure to pay the annual premium be caused by the intervention of war
between the territories in which the insurance company and the assured respectively reside, which makes it unlawful for them to hold intercourse, the policy is
nevertheless forfeited if the company insist on the condition ; but in such case the
assured is entitled to the equitable value of the policy arising from the premiums
actually paid.
This equitable value is the difference between the cost of a new policy and the
present value of the premiums yet to be paid on the forfeited policy when the forfeiture occurred, and may be recovered in an action at law or suit in equity.
The doctrine of revival of contracts, suspended during the war, is one based on
considerations of equity and justice, and cannot'be invoked to revive a contract
which it would be unjust or inequitable to revive-as where time is of the essence
of the contract, or the parties cannot be made equal.
The average rate of mortality is the fundamental basis of life assurance, and as
this is subverted by giving to the assured the option to revive their policies or not
after they have been suspended by war (since none but the sick and dying would
apply), it would be unjust to compel a revival against the company.

ON appeal and in error from the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of Mississippi.
The first of these cases was a bill in equity filed to recover the
amount of a policy of life assurance, granted by the defendants (now
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plaintiffs in error) in 1851, on the life of Dr. A. D. Statham, of
Mississippi, from the proceeds of certain funds belonging to the
defendants attached in the hands of their agent at Jackson, in that
state. It appeared from the statements of the bill that the annual
premiums accruing on the policy were all regularly paid until the
breaking out of the late civil war; but that, in consequence of that
event, the premium due on the 8th of December 1861 was not
paid; the parties assured being residents of Mississippi and the
defendants a corporation of New York. Dr. Statham died in July
1862.
The second case was an action at law brought in the same court
against the same defendants to recover the amount of a policy issued in 1859 on the life of one Henry S. Seyms, the husband of
the plaintiff. In this case also the premiums had been paid until
the breaking out of the war, when by reason thereof they ceased
to be paid, the plaintiff and her husband being residents of Mississippi. Seyms died in May 1862.
The third case was a similar action at law brought in the same
court against the Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York
to recover the amount of a policy issued by them in 1858 on the
life of C. L. Buck, of Vicksburg, Mississippi; the circumstances
being substantially the same as in the other cases.
The policies in all the cases were in the usual form of such instruments, declaring that the company, in considerafion of a certain
specified sum to them in hand paid by the assured, and of an annual premium of the same amount to be paid on the same day and
month in every year during the continuance of the policy, did assure the life of the party named, in a specified amount, for the term
of his natural life. The policies contained various conditions upon
the breach of which they were to be null and void; and amongst
others the following: "that in case the said [assured] shall not
pay the said premium on or before the several days hereinbefore
mentioned for the payment thereof, then, and in every such case,
the said company shall'not be liable to the payment of the sum
insured, or in any part thereof, and this policy shall cease and determine." The Manhattan policy contained the additional provision, that in every case where the policy should cease or become
null and void, all previous payments made thereon should be forfeited to the company.
The non-payment of the premiums in arrear was set up in bar
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of the actions, and the plaintiffs respectively relied on the existence
of the war as an excuse, offering to deduct the premiums in arrear
from the amounts of the policies.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-We agree with the court below, that the contract
is not an assurance for a single year, with a privilege of renewal
from year to year by paying the annual premium, but that it is an
entire contract of assurance for life, subject to discontinuance and
forfeiture for non-payment of any of the stipulated premiums.
Such is the form of the contract, and such is its character. It has
been contended that the payment of each premium is the consideration for ;nsurance during the next following year-as in fire-policies. But the position is untenable. It often happens that the
assured pays the entire premium in advance, or in five, ten, or
twenty annual instalments. Such instalments are clearly not intended as the consideration for the respective years in which they
are paid; for, after they are all paid, the policy stands good for the
balance of the life insured, without any further payment. Each
instalment is, in fact, part consideration of the entire insurance for
life. It is the same thing, where the annual premiums are spread
over.the whole life. The value of assurance for one year of a man's
life when he is young, strong, and healthy, is manifestly not the
same as when he is old and decrepit. There is no proper relation
between the annual premium and the risk of assurance from the
year in which it is paid. This idea of assurance from year to year
is the suggestion of ingenious counsel. The annual premiums are
an annuity, the present value of which is calculated to correspond
with the present value of the amount assured, a reasonable percentage being added to the premiums to cover expenses and contingencies. The whole premiums are balanced against the whole
insurance.
But whilst this is true, it must be conceded that promptness of
payment is essential in the business of life insurance. All the calculations of the insurance company are based on the hypothesis
of prompt payments. They not only calculate on the receipt of
the premiums when due, but on compounding interest upon them.
It is on this basis that they are enabled to offer assurance at the
favorable rates they do. Forfeiture for non-payment is a necessary
means of protecting themselves from embarrassment. Unless it
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were enforceable the business would be thrown into utter confusion.
It is like the forfeiture of shares in mining enterprises, and all
other hazardous undertakings. There must be power to cut off
unprofitable members or the success of the whole scheme is endangered. The insured parties are associates in a great scheme. This
associated relation exists whether the company be a mutual one or
not. Each is interested in the engagements of all; for out of the
co-existence of many risks arises the law of average which underlies the whole business. An essential feature of this scheme is the
mathematical calculations referred to, on which the premiums and
amounts assured are based. And these calculations, again, are
based on the assumption of average mortality and of prompt payments and compound interest thereon. Delinquency cannot be
tolerated nor redeemed, except at the option of the company. This
has always been the understanding and the practice in this department of business. Some companies, it is true, accord a grace of
thirty days, or other fixed period, within which the premium in
arrear may be paid on certain conditions of continued good health,
&c. But this is a matter of stipulation, or of discretion on the part
of the particular company. When no stipulation exists it is the
general understanding that time is material, and that the forfeiture
is absolute if the premium be not paid. The extraordinary and
even desperate efforts sometimes made, when an insured person is
in extremis to meet a premium coming due, demonstrate the
common view of this matter.
The case therefore is one in which time is material and of the
essence of the contract. Non-payment at the day involves absolute
forfeiture, if such be the terms of the contract, as is the case here.
Courts cannot with safety vary the stipulation of the parties by
introducing equities for the relief of the insured against their own
negligence.
But the court below bases its decision on the assumption that
when performance of the condition becomes illegal in consequence
of the prevalence of public war, it is excused, and forfeiture does
not ensue. It supposes the contract to have been suspended during the war, and to have revived with all its force when the war
ended. Such a suspension and revival do take place in the case
of ordinary debts. But have they ever been known to take place
in the case of executory contracts in which time is material ? If
a Texas merchant had contracted to furnish some northern explorer
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a thousand cans of preserved meat by a certain day, so as to be
ready for his departure for the North Pole, and was prevented
from furnishing it by the civil war, would the contract still be good
at the 'close of the war five years afterwards and after the return
of the expedition ? If the proprietor of a Tennessee quarry had
agreed in 1860 to furnish during the two following years ten
thousand cubic feet of marble for the construction of a building
in Cincinnati, could he have claimed to perform the contract
in 1865, on the ground that the war prevented an earlier performance ?
The truth is, that the doctrine of the revival of contracts, suspended during the war, is one based on considerations of equity and
justice, and cannot be invoked to revive a contract which it would
be unjust or inequitable to revive.
In the case of life insurance, besides the materiality of time in
the performance of the contract, another strong reason exists why
the policy should not be revived. The parties do not stand on
equal ground in reference to such a revival. It would operate
most unjustly against the company. The business of insurance is
founded on the law of averages ; that of life insurance eminently
so. The average rate of mortality is the basis on which it rests.
By spreading their risks over a large number of cases, the companies calculate on this average with reasonable certainty and
safety. Anything that interferes with it, deranges the security of
the business. If every policy lapsed by reason of the war should
be revived, and all the back premiums should be paid, the companies would have the benefit of this average amount of risk. But
the good risks are never heard from; only the bad are sought to
be revived-where the person insured is either dead or dying.
Those in health can get new policies cheaper than to .pay arrearages on the old. To enforce a revival of the bad cases, whilst the
company necessarily lose the cases which are desirable, would be
manifestly unjust. An insured person, as before stated, does not
stand isolated and alone. His case is connected with and co-related to the cases of all others insured by the same company. The
nature of the business as a whole must be looked at to understand
the general equities of the parties.
We are of opinion, therefore, that an action cannot be maintained for the amount assured on the policy of life insurance forfeited (like those in question) by non-payment of the premium,
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even though the payment was prevented by the existence of tho
war.
The question then arises, must the insured lose all the money

which has been paid for premiums on their respective policies ?
If they must, they will sustain an equal injustice to that which
the companies would sustain by reviving the policies. At the very
first blush it seems manifest that justice requires that they should
have some compensation or return for the money already paid,
otherwise the companies would be the gainers from their loss; and
that from a cause for which neither party is to blame. The case
may be illustrated thus. Suppose an inhabitant of Georgia had
bargained for a house situated in a northern city, to be paid for
by instalments, and no title to be made until all the instalments
were paid; with a condition that on the failure to pay any of the
instalments when due, the contract should be at an end and the
previods payments forfeited ; and suppose that this condition was
declared by the parties to be absolute and the time of payment
material. Now if some of the instalments were paid before the
war, and others accruing during the war were not paid, the contract, as an executory one, was at an end. If the necessities of
the vendor obliged him to avail himself of the condition and to
re-sell the property to another party, would it be just for him to
retain the money he had received ? Perhaps it might be just if the
failure to pay had been voluntary, or could, by possibility, have
been avoided. But it was caused by an event beyond the control
of either party-an event which made it unlawful to pay. In
such case, whilst it would be unjust, after the war, to enforce the
contract as an executory one against the vendor, contrary to his
will; it would be equally unjust in him, treating it as ended, to
insist upon the forfeiture of the money already paid on it. An
equitable right to some compensation or return for previous payments would clearly result from the circumstances of the case.
The money paid *by the purchaser, subject to the value of any
possession which he may have enjoyed, should ex cequo et bone be
returned to him. This would clearly be demanded by justice and
right.
And so, in the present case, whilst the insurance company has
a right to insist on the materiality of time in the condition of payment of premiums, and to hold the contract ended by reason of
non-pavmert : they cannot with any fairness insist upon the conVOL. XXIV.-92

NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. STATHAM.

dition as it regards tile forfeiture of the premiums already paid.
That would be clearly unjust and inequitable. The insured has an
equitable right to have this amount restored to him, subject to a
deduction for the value of the assurance enjoyed by him whilst the
policy was in existence. In other words, he is fairly entitled to
have the equitable value of his policy.
As before suggested, the annual premiums are not the consideration of assurance for the year in which they are severally paid, for
they are equal in amount; whereas, the risk in the early years of
life is much less than in the later. It is common knowledge that
the annual premiums are increased with the age of the person
applying for insurance. According to approved tables, a person
becoming insured at twenty-five is charged about twenty dollars
annual premium on a policy of $1000; whilst a person at fortyfive is charged about thirty-eight dollars. It is evident, therefore,
that when the younger person arrives at forty-five, his policy has
become (by reason of his previous payments) of considerable value.
Instead of having to pay, for the balance of his life, thirty-eight
dollars per annum, as he would if he took out a new policy on
which nothing had been paid, he has only to pay twenty dollars.
The difference (eighteen dollars per annum during his life) is called
the equitable value of his policy. The present value of the assurance on his life exceeds by this amount what he has yet to pay.
Indeed, the company, if well managed, has laid aside and invested
a reserve fund equal to this equitable value, to be appropriated to
the payment of his policy when it falls due. This reserve fund
has grown out of the premiums already paid. It belongs, in one
sense, to the insured who has paid them, somewhat as a deposit
in a savings bank is said to belong to the person who made the
deposit. Indeed, some life-insurance companies have a standing
regulation by which they agree to pay to any person insured the
equitable value of his policy whenever he wishes it. In otler
words, it is due on demand. But whether thus demandable or not,
the policy has a real value corresponding to it-a value on which
the holder often realizes money by borrowing. The careful capitalist does not fail to see that the present value of the -amount
assured exceeds the present value of the annuity or annual premium yet to be paid by the assured party. The present value of
the amount assured is exactly represented by the annuity which
would have to be paid on a new policy; or, thirty-eight dollars per
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annum in the case supposed, where the party is forty-five years
old; whilst the present value of the premiums yet to be paid on a
policy taken by the same person at twenty-five is but little more
than half that amount. To forfeit this excess, which fairly belongs
to the assured, and is fairly due from the company, and which the
latter actually has in its coffers, and to do this for a cause beyond
individual control, would be rank injustice. It would be taking
away from the assured that which had already become substantially
his property. It would be contrary to the maxim, that no one
should be made rich by making another poor.
We are of opinion, therefore, first, that as the companies elected
to insist upon the condition in these cases, the policies in question
must be regarded as extinguished by the non-payment of the premiums, though caused by the existence of the war, and that an
action will not lie for the amount insured thereon.
Secondly, that such failure being caused by a public war, without the fault of the assured, they are entitled ex aquo et bono to
recover the equitable value of the policies with interest from the
close of the war.
It results from these conclusions that the several judgments and
decrees in the cases before us, being in favor of the plaintiffs for
the whole sum assured, must be reversed, and the records remanded
for further proceedings. We perceive that the declarations in the
actions at law contain no common or other counts applicable to the.
kihd of relief which, according to our decision, the plaintiffs are
entitled to demand; but as the question is one of first impression,
in which the parties were necessarily somewhat in the dark with
regard to their precise rights and remedies, we think it fair and
just tha they should be allowed to amend their pleadings. In
the equitable suit perhaps the prayer for alternative relief might
be sufficient to sustain a propor decree; but nevertheless the complainants should be allowed to amend their bill if they shall be so
advised.
In estimating the equitable value of a policy no deduction should
be made from the precise amount which the calculations give, as
is sometimes done where policies are voluntarily surrendered, for the
purpose of discouraging such surrenders; and the value should be
taken as of the day when the first default occurred in the payment of the premium by which the policy became forfeited. In
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each case the rates of mortality and interest used in the tables of
the company will form the basis of the calculation.
The decree in the equity suit and the judgment in the actions
at law are reversed, and the causes respectively remanded, to be
proceeded in according to law and the directions of this opinion.
agree with the majority of the court in the
WAITE, Ch. J.-I
opinion that the decree and judgments in these cases should be
reversed, and that the failure to pay the annudl premiums as they
matured put an end to the policies, notwithstanding the default
was occasioned by the war, but I do not think that a default, even
under such circumstances, raises an implied promise by the company to pay the assured what his policy "was equitably worth at
the time. I, therefore, dissent from that part of the judgment
just announced, which remands the causes for trial upon such a
promise.
STRONG, J.-While I concur in a reversal of these judgments
and the decree, I dissent entirely from the opinion filed by a
majority of the court. I cannot construe the policies as the majority have construed them. A policy of life insurance is a
peculiar contract. Its obligations are unilateral. It contains no
undertaking of the assured to pay premiums. It merely gives
him an option to pay or not, and thus to continue the obligation
of the insurers or terminate it at his pleasure. It follows that the
consideration for the assumption of the insurers can in no sense be
considered an annuity consisting of the annual premiums. In my
opinion the true meaning of the contract is that the applicant for
insurance, by paying the first premium, obtains an insurance for
one year, together with a right to have the insurance continued
from year to year during his life, upon payment of the same
annual premium, if paid in advance. Whether he will avail himself
of the refusal offered by the insurers or not, is optional with him.
The payment ad dzem of the second or any subsequent premium
is, therefore, a condition precedent to continued liability of the
insurers. The assured may perform it or not at his option. In
such a case the doctrine that accident, inevitable necessity, or the
act of God may excuse performance, has no existence. It is for
this reason that I think the policies upon which these suits were
brought were not in force after the assured ceased to pay -premiums. And so, though for other reasons, the majority of the
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court holds, but they hold at the same time that the assured in
each case is entitled to recover the surrender, or what they call
the equitable value of the policy. This is incomprehensible to
me. I think it has never before been decided that the surrender
value of a policy can be recovered by an assured unless there has
been an agreement between the parties for a surrender, and certainly it has not before been decided that a supervening state of
war makes a contract between private parties, or raises an implication of one.
CLIFFORD, J., dissenting.-Where the parties to an executory
money contract live in different countries and the governments of
those countries become involved in public war with each other, the
contract between such parties is suspended during the existence
of the war and revives when peace ensues; and that rule, in my
judgment, is as applicable to the contract of life insurance as to any
other executory contract. Consequently I am obliged to dissent
from the.opinion and judgment of the court in these cases.
HUNT, J., concurred in this dissent.

Supreme Court of Xi8souri.
IRON MOUNTAIN BANK v. DAVID H. ARMSTRONG.
Courts do not possess the power to change by instructions the issues which the
pleadings present.
An instruction that the jury may disregard the testimony of a witness who has
sworn falsely, concerning any material fact in issue, should not be given. They
cannot reject his evidence unless they believe that he has knowingly testified to an
untruth.
It is not competent, in order to show that a party to a note in suit has authorized the insertion of a clause respecting interest, to show that he was a party to
other notes containing similar clauses.
. A witness cannot be questioned in regard to impertinent matter in order to contradict him.
In suit against the endorser on a promissory note, the defence being an unauthorized alteration, it appeared that in the bottom line, at the end of the note, was
the printed form "for value received" without a printed blank following it, in
which to insert rate of interest (as, e. g., "with interest from at the rate of
per cent. per annum"); but that in the blank space, commencing on the line
with and directly following the words "value received," and running obliquely
upward to avoid the signature, werc written, after the paper left defendant's hands,
the words "with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum after maturity."
Nothing in the color of the ink used in the inserted clause would readily excite
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suspicion. It was held that, although the note did not present a glaring case of
alteration, yet enough appeared to authorize the court under appropriate instructions to leave to the jury the question whether the note was altered in such a manner as to put the plaintiff on inquiry at the time of his purchase.
In a case where a note, framed on a printed blank, was complete at the time it
left the hands of the party sought to be charged, but was so printed as'to give an
apparent authority to fill a blank space occupying the same position relative to the
body of the note that an interest clause usually does, and the space left furnished
ample room for inserting such clause, and the space was not filled in a way to
attract observation, the court strongly inclined to the opinion that the defendant
would be bound to an innocent holder.

APPEAL from St. Louis Circuit Court.

This was a suit on a promissory note, against Armstrong as
endorser. This note was in the usual form on a printed blank,
and contained at the end the words "with interest at 10 per cent.
after maturity." These words were written in the blank space
after the printed words "value received," and were somewhat
slanted upwards towards the right hand of the paper, apparently
to avoid interference with the signature of the maker of the note.
The defendant's answer alleged that these words were subsequently
to his endorsement, and when the instrument was completed, inserted without his knowledge, consent or authority. The answer
also contained the statutory general denial, as to dishonor, notice,
&c.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff and judgment, which, however, was reversed at the general term. From this reversal the
plaintiff appealed.
Slaybacc J-Haeussler, for appellant, cited Putnam v. Sullivan,
4 Mfass. 45; Zimmerman v. Rote, 75 iPenna. St. 188 ; Nebecker
v. Cochrane, 48 Ind. 436; Bitter v. Singmaster, 73 Penna. St.
400; 7 Mo. 231; Redlich v. Doll, 54 N. Y. 234; 1?ainbolt v.
.Eddy, 34 Iowa 440; Garradv. Hadden, 67 Penna. St. 82; 43
Vt. 375; 53 Mo. 516; 54 Id. 77; T-hittemore v. Obear, 68 Id.
286, 287; Gardiner v. Harback, 21 Ill. 130-31; Workman v.
Campbell, 57 Mo. 53-55; Speake v. United States, 9 Cranch.
29; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 540; Bolt v. Dunstervill., 4 T.
R. 313; Barrington v. Bank of Washington, 14 S. & R. 405;
Stahl v. Berger et al., 10 Id. 170-73; Shirts v. Overolhn, G0
Mo. 305; J1oolfoll v. Banc of Am'erica, 10 Bush; Phelan v.
Noss, 67 Penna. St. 59; Stedman et al v. Boone, 49 Ind.; Banc
of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Wcnd. 499; Sandusky v. Scoville, 24

Id. 115.
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Drjden, for respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHERWOOD, J.-In conformity with our previous ruling in the
case of Armstrong v. CapitalBank, at this term, inasmuch as there
was no issue made by the pleadings as to subsequent ratification by
Armstrong of the alleged alteration, the third instruction given at
plaintiff's instance must be held erroneous. It manifestly diverted
the attention of the jury from that which was, to that which was not,
in issue, thus defeating the very object which the law has in contemplation when requiring pleadings to be filed; and a court does
not possess the power to change by instructions the issues which
the pleadings present: foffat v. Conklin, 35 Mo. 453; Camp v.
ifeelan, 43 Id. 591.
Our statute (Wagn. Stat. 1040, § 11) defines a trial as "the
judicial examination of the issue between the parties." Now, it
is obvious, that a trial must fail in accomplishing its statutory
purpose, when diverted to the examination of matters dehors the
record and foreign to the issues.
The second instruction on behalf of the plaintiff was to the
effect that if the interest clause was inserted, either before or after
Armstrong's endorsement, and with his consent, this would warrant a finding in favor of the plaintiff. The serious objection to
this instruction is, that while it may be correct as far as it goes, it
is altogether too narrow in its scope. The other allegations of
the petition, put in issue by the answer, as to whether the bank
was the holder of the note, as to the presentation of the note for
payment, as to its dishonor, as to notice to defendants, &c., are
entirely ignored and lost sight of. And yet all these were controverted facts; all necessary to be proven in order to a recovery.
And this lack in the instruction was not supplied by any others.
The instruction therefore was clearly violative of the principle so
often asserted by this court, that an instruction is erroneous which
singles out certain facts and directs a verdict if they are found,
regardless of other facts at issue: Hines v. HeKinney, 8 Mo. 382;
Sigerson v. Pomroy, 13 Id. 620; Clark v. ifammerle, 27 Id. 55;
Head v. Brotherton, 30 Id. 201. Instructions are equally faulty
whether enlarging or restricting the issues.
The first instruction asked and given for the plaintiff, that " if
the jury believe from the evidence that any witness has sworn
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falsely in regard to any material fact in issue, they are at liberty
to disregard his entire evidence," should have been given, if given
at all, in a different shape from that in which it was asked. It is
not true as a legal proposition, that because a witness has honestly
testified to that which is in point of fact untrue, therefore the jury
may reject the whole of his testimony. It is only where a witness has knowingly testified to an untruth, that an instruction of
this clharacter should be given: Paulette v. Brown, 40 Mo. 52,
and cases cited. The instruction, however, in the case before us
even if properly worded, would appear to have had little, if anything, whereon to base it. It is certain that such an instruction
should not be given in the ordinary routine of jury trials; and
merely because there happens to be a conflict of testimony, such
conflict by no means implies dishonesty of motive. The best citizens of the country, when called to the witness stand, frequently
differ in their versions of the same facts; but yet this alone should
furnish no basis for impugning their purity of purpose, or denouncing them as wholly unworthy of belief.
The fourth instruction asked by defendant should have been
given. The simple fact that the defendant was the endorser of
'four other promissory notes, containing interest clauses, did not
tend in the slightest degree to show that he had authorized the
insertion of a clause respecting interest in the note in suit. These
notes should not have been admitted, or if improvidently admitted
should have been excluded, as asked by the instruction referred to ;
for it is a rudimentary principle' "that the evidence must correspond with the allegations and be confined to the point in issue:"
1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 50, 51, 52, 448. Were the rule otherwise,
litigation would be interminable, by reason of the introduction of
This evidence was received very doubtingly by
collateral issue.
the trial court; but we think it should have been, for the reasons
given, altogether rejected ; and it certainly could not be received
for the purpose of discrediting Armstrong, who had been interrogated on the subject. A witness cannot be questioned as to an
impertinent matter in order to contradict him: Earperv. 1. . St.
E. Railroad Company, 47 Mo. 567; 1 Greeni. Ev., § 449.
In reference to the note in suit, the evidence tended to show
that at the time of its transfer to plaintiff, it was in the same condition as now, and there was nothing impeaching the bona fides of
such transfer. It was shown, however, on the part of the defend-
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ant, that after his endorsement was made and the note redelivered
to Murdock, the maker, the interest clause was inserted in the
absence and without the authority of Armstrong, by the book-keeper
of 'Murdock, at the instance of the latter. The clause respecting
interest is in the same handwriting as the body of the note, all
having been written by the book-keeper, who testified that after
the note had been signed by Murdock & Dickson and endorsed
by Armstrong, witness wrote the words mentioned in an oblique
direction in order to avoid writing over the "D" in thd name of
Dickson. The original note is before us, and although there was
some variance of opinion as to whether the words in question
were written with different ink, we have been able to discover, in
regard to any difference in the color of the ink employed, nothing
which would readily excite observation. This note does not present
a glaring case of alteration like that in the case of The Capital
Bank, above referred to, for there the alteration was in ink of a
different color; was in short, an interlineation patent to even casual observation. If the note, although complete at the time it left
Armstrong's hands, had been so loosely filled, in respect of the
principal sum mentioned therein, as to easily admit of enlarging
the liability already imposed by the instrument, and in a manner
calculated to baffle prudence in its ordinary manifestations, no
hesitancy would be felt in asserting, in accordance with our more
rpecent adjudications, the undoubted liability of the endorser to an
innocent purchaser.
And the same line of remark we regard as applicable in the
present instance. If the instrument was really complete, but was
so carelessly printed as to give an apparent authority to fill a blank
space, occupying the same relative position to the body of the note
that an interest clause usually does, we strongly incline to the
opinion that if this space furnished ample room, and was not filled
in a way to attract observation, the endorser would be bound to an
innocent holder. And in either of the cases instanced, the matter
is for the jury under appropriate instructions. The blank now
under consideration is unquestionably not an ordinary interest
blank, which is usually printed thus, "with interest from -at
-per
cent. per annum." If there was such a blank here, it
would carry on its face, so far as concerns an innocent purchaser,
conclusive authority for filling the spaces thus left, regardless of
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the fact whether such spaces were filled with the adroitness incident to practised penmanship or otherwise, and hence no difficulty
would be experienced in the proper disposition to be made of the
point. If the space left had, in lieu of the words it now contains,
been filled with these, " and one hundred dollars additional after
maturity," no one would doubt that the purchase of such an instrument could not be sanctioned without at once breaking down all
existing barriers between negligence on the one hand and circumspection on the other. But there would seem to exist a certain
degree of appositeness in the insertion of words in the usual place
allotted to them, of the same import as those constituting the
alleged alteration, when no degree of appositeness could be affirmed
of words of the tenor and effect used above, by way of illustrating
an extreme case. And the reason for distinguishing the real from
the hypothetical case must be obvious. In the latter, the insertion
in an unusual place of unaccustomed words should give the alarm
to prudence, and put caution on the alert. But in the former case
it would scarcely seem probable that apprehension should be
awakened by inserting words which accompany as a usual incident
those which compose the body of the note, if such words are apparently inserted contemporaneously with the residue of the written
words of the note, and not in a manner provocative of inquiry.
These considerations induce the belief before expressed, that the
matter of the alteration of the note, .and as to whether, if altered,
it was done in such manner as to challenge investigation, when
purchased by the bank, can be appropriately committed to the triers
of the facts, with proper instructions. The same may be said respecting the question of ratification, in relation to which we refer
to our recent decisions of Evans v. Foreman (decided at our last
term at St. Joseph) and German Bank v. Dunn, decided at the
present term, and also to the following authorities, enunciating the
same doctrine: 2 Green. Ev., § 66; Story Agency, 8 ed., §§ 289,
445, and notes; Paley Agency (by Dunlap) 171, and cases cited;
1 Parsons Cont. 101.
For these reasons the judgment of general term, reversing that
of special term, is affirmed.

